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APPRENDI AT 20: REVIVING THE JURY’S ROLE IN
SENTENCING *
STEPHANOS BIBAS **
When I was in law school in the early 1990s, if we had done a retrospective
on the twentieth or twenty-fifth anniversary of criminal procedure, it would
have been about the Warren Court versus the early Rehnquist Court. 1 It would
have been about the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. It would have been about
the due-process versus crime-control models or law and order versus
defendants’ rights. 2 A mark of how much things have changed, and how
different the debate is today, is that here we are talking about the Sixth
Amendment, and we are not discussing a stale left-right debate.
This Symposium focuses on maybe the most fertile and interesting area of
criminal procedure in the twenty-first century. The Constitution’s jury-trial
guarantees, both in Article III and in the Sixth Amendment, provide that the
trial of all crimes or in all criminal prosecutions shall be by jury. 3 Juries were
designed to be central checks on the legislature, executive, and judiciary. 4 But
the Constitution left unanswered a major question: What sentencing-related
decisions count as part of a criminal trial or a criminal prosecution and so trigger
the jury-trial rights? Back in the eighteenth century, felonies led to fixed
punishments unless there was executive clemency, 5 of which there was a fair
* © 2021 Stephanos Bibas.
** Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Carissa Hessick for organizing this conference and to my law
clerk Julia Fine for excellent research assistance.
1. See generally Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the Warren Court’s innovations in criminal procedure
and the fate of those changes in the ensuing decades); Stephen F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and
Criminal Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1337 (2002) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s rollback of
defendant-friendly Warren Court precedents).
2. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149–73 (1968)
(discussing the values underlying the due-process and crime-control models).
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury . . . .”); id. amend. VI
(“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury . . . .”).
4. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (“The purpose of the jury trial . . . is to
prevent oppression by the Government.”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968); Jenny
Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 829–35 (2015) (discussing the jury’s role as a
check on the power of formal government).
5. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478–80 (2000).
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amount. 6 Imprisonment was not a common form of punishment, and there was
no separate sentencing phase. 7
This began to change right around the time of the Founding. The first
Congress passed a bill that called for mandatory, specific punishments for some
offenses but let judges choose among a broad range of punishments for others. 8
Shortly after that, the United States moved to using imprisonment frequently
and allowing a large degree of flexibility in imposing sentences. 9 So, by the early
nineteenth century, judges had broad discretion to sentence within wide
ranges. 10
The result was a dichotomy in criminal procedure. Jury trials required
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, live hearings, witnesses, and rules of
evidence. 11 Sentencings, by contrast, required no standard of proof, no
witnesses, and no rules of evidence or procedure; rank hearsay was the norm. 12
Williams v. New York 13 in 1949 exemplified this high-water mark of
untrammeled judicial discretion. 14
Perhaps that dichotomy was tolerable as long as the two stages were doing
separate things: The jury trial was historical, backward-looking, factual, and
focused on whodunit. 15 The sentencing was forward-looking, assessing
amenability to rehabilitation, as Williams put it. 16 To the Williams Court, this
was the inevitable march of progress. 17

6. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 54 (2002); Paul J.
Larkin, Jr., Revitalizing the Clemency Process, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833, 851–54 (2016).
7. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478–79 (“The defendant’s ability to predict with certainty the
judgment from the face of the felony indictment flowed from the invariable linkage of punishment
with crime.”); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty
Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1124–26, 1124 n.204 (2001) [hereinafter Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding].
8. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
9. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978), superseded by statute, Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL
SENTENCING 85–87 (1976); Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 1125–26.
10. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 9, at 87–88; Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note
7, at 1125–26.
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246–47 (1949).
12. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 246–47; James J. Bilsborrow, Note, Sentencing Acquitted Conduct to
the Post-Booker Dustbin, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 289, 300–02 (2007).
13. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
14. See id. at 249–52; Bilsborrow, supra note 12, at 301.
15. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 246–47.
16. See id. at 247–48, 248 n.13.
17. See id. at 247–48.

99 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (2021)

2021]

REVIVING THE JURY'S ROLE IN SENTENCING

1191

But by the 1970s, the pendulum had swung back from rehabilitation to
retribution. 18 And the sentencing reform movement began to create sentencing
guidelines to structure and channel judicial sentencing discretion based on the
severity of crimes and criminal records, as well as various aggravating and
mitigating factors. 19 So rather than exercising open-ended, therapeutic
discretion in the name of rehabilitation, judges were now finding discrete facts
that led to particular punishments. 20 This system looked better suited to satisfy
due-process-type values like notice, predictability, and procedural safeguards. 21
But it also looked like judges were usurping the fact-finding role of juries. 22 A
fact that triggered a particular sentence was a sentencing factor that a judge
could find by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than an element of the
crime that a jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt. 23
At first, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 24 the Supreme Court blessed this
approach as a continuation of sentencing discretion. 25 But by 2000, Justices
Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg had won over Justice Thomas, joining
together in Apprendi v. New Jersey 26 to hold that any fact that increases a
maximum sentence (except recidivism) is an element that must be proved to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 27 The Court extended that holding to deathpenalty eligibility in Ring v. Arizona 28 and to state sentencing guidelines in
Blakely v. Washington. 29 Then, the curiously splintered opinion in United States
v. Booker 30 found that binding federal guidelines were unconstitutional. 31 The

18. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW.
U. L. REV. 843, 845–46 (2002).
19. See Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Emperor’s New Clothes: Due Process Considerations Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 60 TENN. L. REV. 467, 484–86 (1993).
20. See id. at 484–85.
21. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the Offender,
and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 181, 181–83 (1988).
22. See Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 304 (1992).
23. Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 1099–100.
24. 477 U.S. 79 (1986), overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (plurality
opinion).
25. Id. at 86.
26. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
27. Id. at 490.
28. 536 U.S. 584 (2002); id. at 609.
29. 542 U.S. 296 (2004); id. at 305.
30. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
31. Id. at 258–59.
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Court remedied that problem not by requiring juries to find facts, but rather by
making the federal guidelines advisory—sort of. 32
These cases are admirable because they confronted fundamental issues of
criminal law that had long lain dormant: What is a crime? Is it whatever the
legislature labels a crime? And what facts trigger punishment? Must all facts
that justify punishment be included in the definition of the crime itself? For
too long, we have ignored the linkage of crime and punishment. At English
common law, jury trials were about both liability and punishment, as juries
manipulated their verdicts to calibrate punishments to crimes. 33 But as
sentencing rules proliferated, sentencing judges decided more and more facts
that might otherwise have been the province of juries. 34 Until Apprendi, courts
had never delineated what procedures were needed at sentencing and what
issues were reserved for juries. 35 Apprendi and Blakely linked criminal procedure
to substantive criminal law, as they tried to define crimes and the procedures
needed to link punishments to crimes. 36
The Apprendi line of decisions was grounded in originalism and
formalism. 37 As an originalist matter, juries, not judges, had to find guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. 38 And as a formalist matter, Justice Scalia argued that if the
Court did not draw a line at these elements, then legislatures and guidelines
could endlessly erode the province of juries. 39 That is how the more originalist
Justices Scalia and Thomas formed an unlikely coalition with the more dueprocess-oriented Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. 40
The problem, though, is that twenty-first-century criminal procedure does
not fit within eighteenth-century boxes. At the time of the Founding,
imprisonment was not widely used as a punishment, 41 and there was nothing

32. Id. at 259–60.
33. Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 1124 & n.204.
34. See Herman, supra note 22, at 304.
35. See Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 1102.
36. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 478, 482–84 (2000).
37. Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia,
the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 195 (2005) [hereinafter Bibas, Originalism
and Formalism].
38. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478.
39. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306–08; see Bibas, Originalism and Formalism, supra note 37, at 194 & n.82.
40. Bibas, Originalism and Formalism, supra note 37, at 194.
41. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 9, at 84–87 (explaining that “[i]ncarceration as
a punishment for the purposes of rehabilitation was practically nonexistent” until the late eighteenth
century).
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like modern sentencing. 42 Plus, there was no plea bargaining. 43 But today,
hardly any cases go to juries anymore. 44 The real battle for power is not judges
versus juries at trial, but judges versus prosecutors at sentencing (or in plea
bargains based on sentencing forecasts). Plea bargains specify facts that trigger
statutory and guideline sentences.
More generally, the Booker remedy for federal sentencing is a truly odd
bird. Though it purported to loosen and transform the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, 45 it left in place a system that prizes technical procedures and
mathematical computations over moral evaluation and reason-giving. 46 That
may perhaps promote more uniform sentences, 47 a topic on which there is much
debate. 48 But it does not promote the more populist, democratic checks that the
Sixth Amendment was designed to ensure. 49
As a newish federal judge, the most striking thing about the sentences that
I review on appeal is how routinized they are. Judges check a series of boxes. 50
It is often hard to tell from the paper record why a judge chose a particular
sentence. In the best of cases, I read transcripts of sentencing judges engaging
personally with the flesh-and-blood defendant before them. But all too often, it
looks as if a defendant has been sentenced by computer. Perhaps the proceeding
is more moving in person than it looks on paper; perhaps not. But the kind of
42. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478–80.
43. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979)
(“[P]lea bargaining did not occur with any frequency until well into the nineteenth century . . . .”).
44. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“[O]urs ‘is for the most part a system of pleas,
not a system of trials . . . .’” (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012))); Elizabeth N. Jones,
The Ascending Role of Crime Victims in Plea-Bargaining and Beyond, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 97, 105 (2014)
(“[P]lea-bargaining is so common that it is almost uncommon to find a criminal case in which pleabargaining does not occur . . . .”).
45. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005).
46. See Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State of Sentencing
After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 625, 631–32 (2007) (discussing the mechanical,
trial-level procedures that the Fourth Circuit requires to uphold a sentencing decision under
reasonableness review).
47. See id. at 625 (“[N]early two-thirds of all sentences are within the prescribed Guidelines range,
a difference of less than ten percent from pre-Booker levels.”).
48. See, e.g., Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 52 (2010) (“Consistent with anecdotal reports from around the country, the first empirical
study of individual judges’ responses to Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall reports a spike in inter-judge
sentencing disparity.”).
49. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & William W. Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst,
66 UCLA L. REV. 448, 473 (2019) (explaining that the Booker remedy failed to “vindicate Sixth
Amendment . . . values”).
50. See United States v. Pruitt, 813 F.3d 90, 91, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2016) (expressing concern that
the “check-a-box section” of a required form for sentencing judges discourages them from providing
reasons for the sentences they impose); Mullen & Davis, supra note 46, at 631–32.
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intensely personal, face-to-face confrontation that the Founders prized is not
happening as often as it should in our mechanized system of justice.
The other disappointment is that the Guidelines hardly seem to be
working as planned. The ideal was that experts would be in charge of drafting
and revising them and that they would continue to revise them in light of the
lessons of experience. 51 Reason-giving and appellate review would create a
feedback loop, encouraging the U.S. Sentencing Commission to do more of
what worked and less of what did not. 52
But from the start, the experts rejected tethering the Guidelines to one
dominant purpose of punishment, like retribution or deterrence. 53 Then
Congress started stepping in and overriding the Commission instead of
deferring to it. 54 And despite many years of criticism of the Guidelines’
mechanistic approach, the Commission does not revisit its fundamental
structure but largely tinkers at the margins. 55
Is there a way back within our high-volume, plea-bargaining assembly
line? Or is Apprendi a ringing symbolic victory with little obvious payoff on the
ground? Can sentencing guidelines, appellate review, or the like be salvaged, or
should they be junked? Is there a way to make the role of juries more
meaningful? Our distinguished panel of scholars will address these and other
questions over the next couple of hours as well as in their essays.

51. Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (2005) (“[T]he Sentencing Commission was intended to gather
feedback about how the system worked and serve as an authoritative (though not final) body of neutral
experts who would translate the feedback into sensible revisions of the rules.”).
52. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1639 (2012).
53. Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Troubling
Silence About the Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2003) (explaining that the
Sentencing Commission “refused to address or identify the purposes of punishment that ground the
guideline system”).
54. See Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing After Booker, in 48 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 137, 138 (Michael Tonry ed., 2019) (asserting that Congress “[did] not avoid
micromanaging the commission’s work” and enacted laws that “override the guidelines wherever they
conflict”).
55. See, e.g., William K. Sessions III, The Relevance of Offender Characteristics in a Guideline System,
51 HOUS. L. REV. 1211, 1220–22 (2014) (discussing the Commission’s “modest” steps toward including
offender characteristics as relevant sentencing factors).

